


USING THE AIR FORCE TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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fulfillment of the requirements for the
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General Studies

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

USING THE AIR FORCE TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT by MAJ Todd Pavich, USAF, 81 pages.

The United States Air Force (USAF) dedicates aircraft, crews, and ground personnel to deliver humanitarian assistance (HA) when and where it is needed. Occasionally this entails penetrating hostile airspace, and these cases are not unique or obscure. Since 1990, political leaders have tasked the USAF to conduct HA airdrops in Northern Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The USAF has a role and is being utilized to assist relief efforts. The exact nature of this role, however, is still undefined in Air Force doctrine.

This thesis will determine if the Air Force should be used to conduct the HA mission in a hostile environment. It will focus primarily on airlift assets in a hostile environment and assess USAF abilities using the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability or FAS test. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo serve as case studies and provide environments where HA could and could not be conducted.

The USAF airlift fleet has both a global reach and the ability to operate in austere environments. It is feasible to task these assets to provide conventional relief. Acceptability is based on risk and cost. A political-military plan was developed for each case study to identify interest, objectives, end state, and others. In Bosnia, the risk to U.S. personnel was acceptable, and in Kosovo, it was not. This will always change with environment, technology, and political will. The Mohonk criteria provide guidance on when it is suitable to use the military for HA. In both case studies, the USAF met the established criteria and delivered HA when other agencies could not. Humanitarian airdrops were conducted within Bosnia to stranded civilians. Airlift missions to austere fields were conducted on the periphery of Kosovo for refugees. The USAF has a role in HA operations and doctrine is required to provide operational and tactical guidance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ACRONYMS	vi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW	11
Military Doctrine	12
Humanitarian Perspective	14
Government Documents	16
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY	20
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS	24
Bosnia Case Study	28
Feasibility	28
Acceptability	33
Suitability	42
Kosovo Case Study	49
Feasibility	52
Suitability	53
Acceptability	55
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION	60
REFERENCE LIST	70
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	73
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	74

ACRONYMS

CCO	Complex Contingency Operation
CHE	Complex Humanitarian Emergency
FAS	Feasibility, Acceptability, Suitability
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HDR	Humanitarian Daily Ration
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JP	Joint Publications
JTF	Joint Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OPP	Operation Provide Promise
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PO	Peace Operations
pol-mil	political-military
TRIADS	Tri-Wall Aerial Delivery System
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
U.S.	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USCR	United States Committee for Refugees

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States (U.S.) military is trained and equipped to fight and win wars. It deploys anywhere in the world to protect national interests, and applies sustained combat force at the direction of the president. This is the primary purpose of the military, but it hardly encapsulates all the missions it performs. Since the end of the cold war, operations have become much more complex and multidimensional. A massive force-on-force engagement is less likely to occur, and surgical strikes, asymmetric maneuver, and information campaigns are becoming the norm. There are actually many military alternatives to large-scale combat operations, and, in fact, most of today's military operations fall well short of war. Joint doctrine categorizes these options as military operations other than war and details a lengthy list of "secondary" missions. Although some of these missions may involve combat, many do not. The purposes of military operations other than war are, first and foremost, to deter war and promote peace (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001a, I-3). To this end, the many inherent capabilities of the military are leveraged to ensure or establish stable environments. Humanitarian assistance (HA) has become a common military operations other than war mission performed by the military to help reestablish regional stability.

Joint publications (JP) define HA as a viable mission, and provide the appropriate guidance to understand how operations should be initiated. JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, provides a plethora of information about HA and elaborates on the tasks required by the military to coordinate

efforts for this mission. The JP, however, does not detail specific service component procedures.

The United States Air Force (USAF) often dedicates aircraft, crews, and ground personnel to deliver humanitarian aid when and where it is needed. Usually this is not more complicated than a flight from one secure airport to another. In these cases, the USAF obviously has a role and is routinely utilized to assist relief efforts. Occasionally, however, delivery entails penetrating hostile airspace, avoiding surface-to-air weapons, and airdropping food packages to feed the hungry. Cases involving hostile environments are not unique or obscure, and since 1990, political leaders have tasked the USAF to conduct HA airdrops in the hostile or potentially hostile environments of Northern Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. In light of these missions, it is reasonable to believe Air Force doctrine exists to support humanitarian operations. This, however, is not the case. The USAF lacks specific tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct HA flights in a hostile environment, and yet this very mission is becoming more common. Perhaps the humanitarian missions the Air Force has performed in the past have already set a precedent, and HA will consistently be a part of future operations. The goal of this thesis is to determine if this is a viable mission for the Air Force.

The primary question of this thesis is: Should the Air Force be used to conduct HA in a hostile environment? To help answer this question, this thesis will explore the role of the Air Force with respect to the HA mission. Specifically, it will focus on HA in a hostile environment and determine if Air Force assets are capable of conducting humanitarian operations in the midst of hostilities. To guide this study, the abilities of the Air Force will be assessed using the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test.

These are the secondary questions for this thesis, and it will determine if it is feasible to task Air Force assets to provide dedicated support to the HA mission. It will determine if committing Air Force assets is acceptable to the political decision makers in lieu of tasking other military or civilian asset. Finally, it will assess the suitability of using air assets vice other options to effectively provide assistance. This is not only to meet the demands of those in need, but also to augment the efforts of humanitarian agencies when other options are untenable or unavailable.

The limitations to this study are primarily self-imposed with one exception. The moral and legal issues surrounding humanitarian intervention will not be addressed in this thesis. Although the subject is inherent to this topic, whether or not it is right or just is beyond the scope of this thesis. This study is more concerned with using the Air Force to respond to a crisis vice another option. The self-imposed limitations are necessary to keep the thesis unclassified and within a manageable length. Only unclassified material was used during research. Despite the fact many military reports remain classified well after the event; the material obtained through open sources was adequate to complete the evaluation. In addition, only two case studies were researched in an effort to keep this thesis within its required length. Although every humanitarian crisis is different, the selected studies provide an excellent study about the Air Force and HA.

HA is considered a noncombat mission initiated in response to natural or man-made disasters. Nature and man both have the ability to thoroughly destroy infrastructures and deprive people of the necessary resources for survival. Nature is indiscriminate in its destruction and can inflict immediate damage over a vast area. Man, on the other hand, is generally more selective and targets a specific group of people in a

specific region. Either case constitutes an emergency. For nations with fragile economies or governments, this can be devastating. For the world community, it is destabilizing.

The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 to specifically promote international peace and preventing this type of regional instability falls squarely within its realm of responsibility. It has many agencies dedicated to humanitarianism with the resources and expertise to render aid. It also enjoys the political support of the international community. It does not, however, have an organic military force.

Unfortunately, military forces are sometimes required to conduct the HA mission either by assisting with logistical efforts or by establishing security to facilitate assistance in the region. In the event a regional crisis requires a military response, the UN must solicit member nations for forces. Whether or not forces are provided, however, depends entirely on the motives of political leaders.

Political objectives are diverse and ever changing, and they will determine if and when military operations other than war and, therefore, HA are executed (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995, vii). Recent history suggests there are occasions when political objectives support the use of military forces for humanitarian purposes. The 1999 war in Kosovo is an excellent example of this and will subsequently be addressed in the thesis. Whether or not the Air Force conducts future HA missions will be entirely determined by political leadership. If the political leadership is willing to commit the Air Force to an HA mission, then the Air Force must be ready.

In June 1948, less than one year after becoming an independent service of the Armed Forces, the USAF embarked on an operation specifically dedicated to humanitarian relief. Post World War II Germany was almost destined to become a

humanitarian crisis. German forces had spent years fighting the Allies, and the subsequent defeat of the former left them at the mercy of the Allied nations. Four zones were created out of Germany and controlled individually by the U.S., Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Based on postwar agreements, the reparation of Germany within each zone became the responsibility of the controlling county. The U.S. and Great Britain genuinely sought to rebuild Germany and return it to a prosperous state. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, preferred to completely destroy any future economic capabilities Germany might enjoy (Haydock 1999, 58). This dichotomy among the Allies led eventually to the isolation of West Berlin.

Although Berlin was geographically located within the Soviet zone of control, it was divided into four sectors, each controlled by one of the four Allies. West Berlin contained the U.S., British, and French sectors, and the Soviet Union controlled all of East Berlin. The city became the focal point for two differing political agendas, and the differences between East and West became quite pronounced. Capitalism provided more opportunities than did Communism, and the Soviet Union did not want any model of capitalism to remain within its zone of control. Tensions continued to rise until the Soviet Union finally took steps intended to force the Western Allies to relinquish West Berlin and leave the Soviet zone. In essence, the people of western Berlin were to be sacrificed by taking advantage of the already untenable supply situation. The Soviets established a ground embargo to stop supplies bound for West Berlin and perpetuate the problem of feeding the Germans. Thus, when faced with the prospects of mass starvation, the West would surely acquiesce. The Allies, however, were not intimidated. With few options short of armed conflict, they demonstrated their resolve and chose to initiate airlift

missions to supply the city and break the blockade. Ironically, the operation was only meant to last a few weeks. Diplomatic efforts were to achieve an amicable agreement and reopen the ground routes. Unfortunately, diplomacy did not prevail, and the Berlin airlift sustained the city by air until September 1949. In the end, the Soviets did capitulate and reopen the ground resupply routes.

The Berlin Airlift is an excellent example of using airpower to conduct humanitarian operations. Although not conducted in a combat zone, the operation took place in a politically charged hostile environment. The threat of war between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies was very real. In fact, the airlift operation was the only option available to demonstrate U.S. commitment without aggressively pursuing armed conflict. The capability of airlift forces to provide the necessary daily supplies of an entire city achieved the desired political objectives. More importantly, it set a precedent. The Air Force had the capacity to provide for people in need, and HA became a mission for the military.

Employing military resources for HA in the wake of a natural disaster is a relatively simple decision. If and when the government of a troubled nation requests assistance, the international community generally responds. Large-scale natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, create a humanitarian crisis in countries with limited resources. The ability to render aid simply does not exist, and immediate assistance must come from external nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). This mission belongs primarily to NGOs with the necessary training and expertise to facilitate reconstruction. However, it also requires a logistical capability not inherent to most NGOs. The military has the unique ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy resources on a

much larger scale than most NGOs. It is completely self-sufficient and accustomed to establishing life-sustaining services. These capabilities make the military an attractive option to governments wishing to help restore order from chaos. Military forces provide initial relief until NGOs have resources in place and are capable of assuming the mission. In addition, they represent a decisive action by the leaders who commit forces to the relief effort. The military thus provides stability for the host nation and public approval for participating world leaders. As stated before, this is a relatively easy decision, especially when compared to the prospect of using the military to rectify man-made disasters.

Unlike the indiscriminate devastation caused by natural disasters, man-made disasters create humanitarian emergencies through purposeful neglect, persecution, or war. These are products of internal conflict, and conflicts begin within a state for a variety of reasons. Some states struggle with differences in politics, ethnicity, or religion. Others simply cannot muster or manage the necessary resources for the population. In either case, civil unrest is generated to challenge or sway the balance of power, thus leading to internal conflict. Ironically, this only perpetuates the downward spiral of a fragile state and results in, among other things, a complex humanitarian emergency (CHE). HA is a military mission in response to an emergency, and a CHE presents world leaders with a very difficult situation. Not only is regional stability jeopardized by states involved in civil war, ethnic cleansing, or human rights abuses, but the victims of these actions also tend to amass in very large numbers. Many flee to neighboring countries and seek recognition as refugees. The alternative is to find a sanctuary within their own country to escape the threat in whatever forms it may be. These people are classified as

internally displaced persons (IDP) and represent a truly unique challenge for humanitarian agencies and the military when conducting HA. Not only are they sometimes difficult to locate, it is also often difficult to ascertain their condition and specific needs.

Refugees are protected by international humanitarian law and are afforded rights and responsibilities consistent with their country of asylum. These rights are spelled out in the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the subsequent Protocol of 1967. IDPs, on the other hand, do not share this luxury. There are no binding international laws to protect them. They remain subject to the laws of their own state and in many cases victims of the internal conflict. Legally, the burden of providing protection and assistance to IDPs rests with the host nation. In cases where the host nation is committing or promoting the hostilities, the only hope for IDPs is from external sources. The United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) in its *World Refugee Survey 2003* estimates 21.8 million people around the world can be categorized as IDPs. This number, in addition to the 13.0 million refugees, constitutes a significant humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian agencies, world leaders, and the military must rectify these situations hopefully before, but definitely after, they occur. The challenging task, however, is to accomplish this within the borders of a sovereign state.

Humanitarian intervention is a term commonly used to describe the use of military force to facilitate humanitarian aid and relief efforts within a country. On the surface it sounds like a noble venture for the military, but it is actually fraught with controversy as it entails entering a sovereign nation without invitation. Despite the controversy, intervention for the sake of humanitarianism has become a common military

response to regions in crises since the end of the cold war. Since 1990 the U.S. has intervened in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo to specifically conduct the HA mission. In addition, recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have included HA as an additional mission for the military. Internal conflicts created the humanitarian disasters in these countries, and the emergencies evolved over a considerable amount of time. Eventually the scale of suffering became intolerable to the international community, and political leaders deemed military force necessary. Unfortunately, this is the paradigm of humanitarian intervention and from it stems the controversy. The sovereignty of a state must be respected, but as conditions within the state deteriorate, the pressure to intervene becomes greater. Eventually, military capabilities must be leveraged, and the noncombat HA mission is executed in a hostile environment to facilitate relief efforts.

Man-made disasters caused by persecution, neglect, or civil wars do not create an immediate CHE. They are caused when an internal conflict persists or escalates. Ironically, the initial signs of an impending crisis do not automatically entice the international community to physically intervene. While diplomatic interest will generate efforts to restore stability, military efforts will be avoided until the scope of the conflict requires military force. Large-scale suffering of a population will draw worldwide attention and definitely change the scope. Political leaders will be pressed to eliminate the source of suffering and attend to the unfortunate masses, and suffice it to say, they can be coerced by public opinion. Diplomacy is always the preferred method of alleviating a crisis, but when diplomacy fails, the military may be called upon to restore order and ensure security for relief efforts. When the crisis is a result of an oppressive government

or civil disorder, the security of relief efforts is always at risk. The role of the U.S. military is generally to provide protection for civilian agencies to reduce this risk. For more hostile environments, however, NGOs become less effective due to security concerns and the military becomes the primary provider of assistance. Ultimately the military goal is to create stability and pass control of humanitarian operations back to NGOs as soon as possible. Until this occurs, the military plays a very important role during the initial stages of a CHE. In order to provide HA in a hostile environment, military intervention must occur and forces must take an active role to provide assistance.

If the USAF is used to stop human atrocities within a state and simultaneously provide relief to the victims, parallel operations must occur. This requires combat forces for armed intervention and mobility assets for HA. Both operations are initiated to achieve political goals, and generally the primary political goal is to establish regional security. Both operations contribute to this goal, and one can arguably not succeed without the other. Given the fact they are equally important, humanitarian operations require the necessary guidance and resources to execute the mission.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The end of the cold war brought about a shift in political and military focus. Almost overnight the U.S. became the sole world superpower and with it came the perceived responsibility of maintaining world order. The previous U.S. philosophy of deterring conflict with the Soviet Union centered on each other's ability to cause mutual destruction. This was no longer a necessity, and this philosophy gave way to a focus on regional stability. Arguably the world was less stable after the cold war, and in lieu of this new strategy, military forces deployed in ever increasing numbers to facilitate peace. Not surprisingly, the military was not prepared to take on the new role of stabilization expert. The doctrine to provide direction simply did not exist, and the need for guidance became more apparent with every deployment. To this end, President Clinton in May 1997 produced Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations* [CCO].” This document laid the groundwork for joint military doctrine with respect to HA. First and foremost it identified the nature of the problem and defined the term CCO.

In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace, and may be accompanied by natural or manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex contingency operations. (Federation of American Scientists 1997, 1)

The document describes CCO as including, among others, peace operations (PO), humanitarian intervention, and foreign humanitarian assistance. More importantly, it

identifies the importance of coordination among all U.S. agencies that participate in a CCO. This is the significant aspect of the document. Interagency cooperation is vital to the success of these missions, but the relationship between the military and other agencies has not always been accommodating. From this document, the joint military doctrine addressing HA was penned.

Military Doctrine

JP 3-07.6, as mentioned in chapter 1, provides a great deal of information about HA. This is the one publication for obtaining a thorough understanding of the fundamentals. It details the HA mission, the legal authority to conduct the mission, and the required coordination with other agencies to make it successful. The tactics, techniques, and procedures contained in JP 3-07.6 provide the necessary guidance for the military to plan and execute HA from a joint perspective. According to military doctrine, the purpose is to provide relief to those suffering as a result of natural or man-made disasters (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001b, vii). While this may involve providing security, it is not about applying combat force. Humanitarian operations may be conducted in a hostile environment, but the flavor of this publication is not combat oriented. If a complex emergency requires both HA and combat power, then HA must marry with another military mission. In essence, a CCO is created. JP 3-07.6 adopts and defines the concept of CCO exactly as it is addressed in PDD 56. A CCO includes PO, HA, and humanitarian intervention (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001b, I-7). The PO mission provides the force, if necessary, and is well defined in JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*. The concept of humanitarian intervention, however, is not developed in joint military doctrine. Despite being used in

the definition of CCO, humanitarian intervention is not a military mission under the military operations other than war umbrella.

Appendix J of Joint Publication 3-08, “Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies: The Mohonk Criteria,” was developed in 1994 at the World Conference on Religion and Peace. It was incorporated into this joint publication to provide military commanders with insight into the HA relief community. Its purpose is to address the CHE issues of those agencies responsible for the delivery of HA. It does not provide guidance, but does establish guidelines and recommendations for political leaders, military forces, and especially humanitarians. This document strives to focus the efforts of the three actors in a CHE. The flavor of this document is clearly humanitarian. It remains committed to and reiterates the humanitarian principles but also provides for the political and military role.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War* is the source publication for Air Force guidance on the HA mission. It is a very general document with few specifics, and like the joint publication, it suggests HA is a noncombat mission. It identifies the type of Air Force units that will typically respond to an emergency to provide support. Specifically, it mentions medical and engineer units, and allows for air mobility, security, and communications support. Air assets in support of this mission are limited to mobility, collection, and rescue capabilities. All of this, however, is dedicated to supporting the host nation government according to this document. In fact, it does not allow for the possibility of conducting HA in a hostile environment or within a state without host nation permission. Air Force doctrine about PO provides this perspective.

Guidance on PO is also contained in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, and is only slightly more detailed than the paragraph regarding HA. Both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are addressed but with little more than a paragraph acknowledging the difference between the two. The peace enforcement mission more aptly applies to this thesis, as it is conducted in a hostile environment. For combat aircraft, peace enforcement involves traditional operations with perhaps stricter rules of engagement. For mobility aircraft, the environment presents risks generally not associated with HA airlift missions. The definitive aspect of the doctrine is the acknowledgment of the need to conduct HA during PO. It states, “Modern peace operations are often part of complex emergencies requiring humanitarian assistance or nation-building” (Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 2000, 22). Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 identifies HA in a hostile environment as a likely military mission. To evaluate if and how the Air Force should accomplish this requires a more detailed examination of the literature produced by the civilian humanitarian experts.

Humanitarian Perspective

Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War, by Mary B. Anderson, studies how to effectively provide aid during a conflict to reduce suffering and promote peace. While this book does not specifically address the use of the Air Force to facilitate humanitarian aid, it does provide insight into how agencies must adapt their aid programs during conflict. Anderson objectively evaluates the nature of internal conflicts and wars. In doing so, she identifies why wars are fought, their characteristics, and the typical tensions between combatants. She contends aid is not a separate venture, but naturally

becomes a part of the conflict. Her intention is to improve aid by becoming familiar with the nuances of the conflict and understanding how aid affects the conflict.

Anderson stresses aid during a conflict is good, but readily accepts the fact it can have a negative impact. Her goal is for humanitarian agencies to develop programs to continue to provide aid without fueling the conflict. This aspect of the book provides the most beneficial information for this thesis. She lists five predictable negative economic affects of aid, and provides programming options for agencies to mitigate their impact. Her list is paraphrased below.

1. Aid is stolen to support armies and buy weapons.
2. Aid affects markets by reinforcing the war economy.
3. Distributing aid unevenly fuels tensions.
4. Aid substitutes for local resources, allowing them, in turn, to support the conflict.
5. Possession of aid legitimizes people and their agendas (1999, 39).

Famine, Conflict, and Response: A Basic Guide, by Fred Cuny, is a tremendous asset for humanitarians seeking “how to” guidance. This book essentially provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct famine relief. Cuny is well known for his work in humanitarian relief and has published several works to share his expertise. This book is filled with details every agency should know about relief operations. His focus is centered on counterfamine intervention, and how to use economic-based techniques to facilitate recovery. The relevance of this aspect to this thesis lies only in recognizing the USAF has absolutely no role in this type of program. The true benefit to this thesis is the conventional assistance requirements Cuny suggests are vital to establish the groundwork

for more detailed relief programs. Fortunately, this book is replete with lists, rules-of-thumb, and considerations regarding conventional assistance. Cuny discusses logistics and distribution issues, to include air movement and operational issues, to include political and cultural constraints. Finally, he provides insight into operations during a conflict. The gems in this book for this thesis lie in the chapters about approaches to famine relief, emergency response, and operational issues.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies, by Andrew S. Natsios, is another excellent source for this thesis. It explores the nature of a CHE and provides a political perspective to relief operations. It also studies NGOs and the media to examine their impact on political decisions and policy. Natsios ties his experience as a state representative, an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel (retired), and a humanitarian administrator into this very pragmatic publication. In addition to the political issues, Natsios takes an evaluated look at the military strengths and weaknesses in response to humanitarian endeavors. More importantly, he provides suggested principles governing the use of the military in a complex emergency.

Government Documents

The National Intelligence Council produced a document, “Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends and Projections, 2001-2002.” It is a collection of material by many experts in the federal government, compiled and coordinated under Doctor David F. Gordon, National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues. As with any intelligence estimate, this study is based on some assumptions, but provides a logical case for future humanitarian emergencies. The study highlights thirteen countries with crises

due to either internal conflict or government repression. The real benefit lies in the categorization of response and potential world conditions to warrant action.

Historical studies of military response to CHEs provide the core information for this thesis. *The Bosnia Air Drop Study*, produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses, provides an analytical view of the humanitarian airdrop missions over Bosnia. After quickly establishing the environment within Bosnia, it elaborates on the execution of the airdrop mission. This includes the concept of operations, command and control, and the technical aspects of airdrops. Significant to this thesis, it evaluates the effectiveness of the airdrops, to include the nonquantifiable impact. Although the study is primarily concerned with the airdrop relief effort, there was also a significant airland mission into Sarajevo at the same time. The study offers data on the airland mission beneficial to this thesis but little on airland analysis. The analytical nature of this study rests with airdrop; in fact, the study produced a guide to determine the suitability of pursuing humanitarian airdrop missions during a complex emergency.

UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, is a compilation of studies submitted by multiple authors to provide insight into UN activities in the 1990s. This book was edited by William Durch in 1996, who incidentally coauthored the chapter pertinent to this thesis with James Schear. Entitled “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” it provides an in depth evaluation of the events leading to the division of Yugoslavia and the response of the international community. It includes a study not only of the history, but also of the political considerations and choices of the U.S., as well as many other UN countries. It was an excellent source to establish the necessary background information about the events in

Bosnia that caused it to slip into civil war. It detailed the UN mission in Yugoslavia and how it migrated from Croatia and into Bosnia. In addition, it highlighted the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and the requirement to alter the mission of UN forces to facilitate humanitarian aid. It is a complete source on the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia, and, therefore, lends insight into the conditions resulting in the U.S. role in Bosnia.

The Road to Kosovo: A Balkan Diary, by Greg Campbell, was published in 1999. It is a first person account of Campbell's experience while reporting the events in the Balkans. In addition to his observations, he has conducted the necessary research to provide historical detail about this region and the events leading to the war in Kosovo. This source provides background information on Kosovo for this thesis and includes assessments from an author who was in Kosovo to experience the situation.

In January 2000, the Department of Defense submitted its official after-action report to Congress on Operation Allied Force and Kosovo. Although this report is focused primarily on the aerial combat operations of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it does address the challenges of conducting simultaneous combat and HA missions. The section dedicated to HA includes information about refugees and the military actions taken to provide relief. It acknowledges the coordination challenges with relief agencies during the initial stages of the war and also the ad hoc actions taken to deal with the humanitarian situation. Despite the brevity of the HA section in the report, it establishes the need for better coordination and cooperation among U.S. government agencies when dealing with a crisis.

This sentiment is echoed in a study released by the Department of State in April 2000. The study, titled "Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian Humanitarian

and Transition Programs,” actually includes several case studies of various interventions. Kosovo is among these studies and provides a candid evaluation of the U.S. government response to the humanitarian situation. The Kosovo case study lists ten lessons learned from their review. These lessons learned are politically oriented and provide insight into the planning, coordination, and leadership shortfalls of the U.S. government and the humanitarian community. It also addresses the need to better understand how much impact the media may have on the situation and their ability to sway public opinion. Among the discrepancies, however, successes are noted, to include the return of refugees after the conflict.

The strategic and operational lessons were adequately identified by the Department of Defense and Department of State studies. The tactical lessons come from personal experience as a lead Air Force airlift planner for Kosovo operations. This author was a member of an Air Force team to develop a concept plan to provide HA in conjunction with combat operations. He also evaluated the threat environment to airlift operations within Kosovo, and provided assessments to senior Air Force leadership. His experience is included in the analysis portion of this thesis. It includes expertise on airlift capabilities, the Kosovo environment, and airlift missions to support HA operations during the war in Kosovo.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis will rely on the historical method of research to analyze the FAS of conducting HA in a hostile environment. By exploring some of the post cold war military events, perhaps a future course for HA air operations can be established. Analysis based on assessing feasibility, acceptability, and suitability is commonly referred to as conducting a FAS test. To provide a common frame of reference for the research in this thesis, it must be defined.

Feasibility is determined purely by the capability to perform a task. This thesis will evaluate the capabilities of Air Force aircraft to physically perform HA. The focus of this section will be on airlift aircraft to present their size, range, and tactical capabilities. A feasibility study in this case will produce a definitive result. Quite simply, the Air Force aircraft either can or cannot perform this mission. Acceptability, on the other hand, is much more subjective. It is determined by comparing either the cost or risk of an operation to the potential benefits it may produce. To conduct this analysis, the political-military (pol-mil) planning tool will be reviewed using after action studies from Bosnia and Kosovo. This will determine if the political leadership elected to commit Air Force assets because it was the acceptable response, given the cost and risks to forces. The final piece of the FAS test is suitability. This is also somewhat subjective. It is determined by comparing a selected course of action to various alternatives. Although a comparative use of ground versus air forces will be briefly discussed, this section seeks to determine if it is suitable to use the Air Force in lieu of or in addition to humanitarian assets or methods.

This research is centered on USAF operations, and only reports from operations involving humanitarian airlift missions were evaluated. To further focus the study, only humanitarian airlift missions conducted within a hostile or potentially hostile environment were considered for review. The military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo provide good case studies for evaluation because of the role airpower played in each case.

Operation Provide Promise (OPP) and Operation Allied Force (OAF) were very different missions from a military standpoint, and yet both included a massive amount of humanitarian aid. These operations are the case studies for this thesis, and will be analyzed to determine how effective airpower was in conducting HA. Despite the fact both occurred in the former Yugoslavia, they provide uniquely different military environments to compare and contrast. OPP was conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina with UN troops on the ground. OAF, on the other hand, was conducted in Kosovo entirely from the air. Both environments were hostile to air forces, and thus determined how air assets were utilized to deliver HA.

The majority of the analysis will focus on Bosnia. This case study provides the necessary information to complete the FAS test by using the pol-mil planning guidelines and the Mohonk criteria to determine acceptability and suitability. These additional resources are necessary to capture the political and humanitarian perspective. The pol-mil plan was produced by a political leader, and the Mohonk criteria were developed by humanitarian representatives. Both of these products are incorporated into joint doctrine and will provide the framework to conduct the analysis of Air Force involvement in HA missions. Because assessing acceptability and suitability is relatively subjective, the

analysis will attempt to use objective data from the case studies to account for the varying perspectives.

As mentioned in chapter 2, PDD 56 was produced by the Clinton administration to establish policy on managing a CCO. Much of the document was incorporated into the JP on HA. The specific feature relative to this study is the requirement to develop a pol-mil plan. The pol-mil plan allows interagency coordination prior to committing resources to a CHE. It guides the actions of planners to ensure their analysis of the CHE is complete. By framing their analysis, the recommendation for a concept of operation remains consistent with the capabilities of available resources and tasks they may be required to accomplish. If completed with an objective assessment, the pol-mil plan highlights the conditions to achieve acceptability from a political perspective. The tenets of the pol-mil plan will be developed using information from multiple sources to answer why it was acceptable to use the Air Force to execute the operations.

The Mohonk Criteria for HA in complex emergencies is the product of the Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in HA. The task force was established to address the issues associated with providing HA in a CHE, especially when military forces are introduced to the environment. The content of these criteria is primarily focused on reasserting the humanitarian mandate to provide assistance under international law. It very clearly reaffirms “everyone has the right to request and receive humanitarian aid . . . [and] humanitarian agencies have the right to offer and deliver humanitarian aid where needed” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996, J-2). This document actually contains several sets of criteria divided among sections. This thesis will use the criteria for the section addressing HA within the range of responses to complex emergencies.

This section establishes guidelines for political decision makers, humanitarian actors, and military forces. Other inputs from humanitarian experts are necessary to provide technical requirements, but by comparing the case study operations to the Mohonk criteria, conceptual suitability for the use of airpower to conduct HA can be established.

Military lessons learned provide historical insight into the use of forces to conduct specific missions. They are, however, justifiably slanted toward military objectives. Obviously, determining success or failure depends on point of view. To achieve a more complete analysis of HA, the initial criteria must account for each perspective. The reports published about USAF HA activities in a hostile environment provide the military perspective. The additional political and humanitarian criteria mentioned above provide the additional pieces to complete a thorough analysis of this complex venture.

Ideally, a thorough analysis of military reports, political agendas, and humanitarian requirements will determine if the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for the USAF is warranted. The framework for this analysis is based on the FAS test, and it should highlight the appropriate use of Air Force participation in a CHE. The analysis necessary to answer each element of the FAS test will lead to an answer of the primary thesis question: Should the Air Force be utilized for humanitarian operations in a hostile environment?

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

During the cold war, the world was focused on the potential of a nuclear exchange between the West and the East, and this naturally shaped the military mindset. The U.S. in the West and the Soviet Union in the East, both maintained the nuclear capability to destroy each other many times over. Obviously, war between these two nations would have been catastrophic and, therefore, had to be avoided. In addition, any regional disturbance with the potential to pit the superpowers against each other also had to be avoided. To this end, the governments of the East and West actively sought to minimize regional hostilities.

Ironically, the end of the cold war made the prospect of maintaining regional stability much more difficult. The Soviets lost their superpower status and their ability to influence other states either politically or militarily. For many regions in the East, this was an opportunity to become independent nation states. Most were able to achieve this transition peacefully. Other attempts at this transition, however, resulted in civil strife due primarily to ethnic differences. Regional hostilities were an unfortunate by-product of the end of the cold war, but they were by no means limited to Soviet-influenced nations. There are nations in Africa that have waged civil wars for years and continue to do so today.

The end of the cold war changed the way U.S. military forces were used in the 1990s. Once postured primarily to stop the spread of communism, they are now playing a larger role in the world environment with a variety of missions in addition to flexing

military might. The post cold war military mission includes HA because of the nature of many regional conflicts. States mired in civil conflict are creating or exacerbating humanitarian emergencies. CCO is the current term used to describe missions in response to CHE. This is incorporated in joint doctrine but not Air Force doctrine. Because the Air Force has routinely demonstrated the ability to provide HA during conflicts, it is always tasked to do so. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if it is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to use the Air Force to conduct HA in a hostile environment. If the analysis suggests it is, the Air Force should be tasked when required. Furthermore, the doctrine to effectively conduct this mission must also be thoroughly developed. To effectively analyze Air Force capabilities, it is first necessary to define a CHE to establish the operating environment and develop the requirements.

Mr. Andrew Natsios is the current administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. According to him, there are five characteristics of a CHE. The first and most visible is civil conflict based on ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities. Atrocities are likely to occur in addition to the civil conflict. The second is a diminishing or lack of a national governing authority. This leads to the inability to provide public services and, more importantly, political control over the state. Power passes to regional leaders, and the struggle for total power is perpetuated. The third characteristic involves large-scale population movements to escape warring factions or to search for food. This creates the classic flow of IDPs to safer regions or refugees across international borders out of the state. The failure of the economic system is the fourth characteristic, to include hyperinflation, high unemployment, and currency devaluation, if not destruction. A displaced or combative population cannot maintain economic viability.

Finally, the effects of the first four characteristics are compounded by drought or another type of environmental disaster. Food, security, and availability are further restricted leading to malnutrition and potentially widespread starvation (Natsios 1997, 7). Not surprisingly, these characteristics are consistent with the causes of famine and create the conditions for humanitarian intervention.

Famine is “a set of conditions that occur when large numbers of people in a region cannot obtain sufficient food and widespread, acute malnutrition results” (Cuny 1999, 1). Mr. Cuny suggests war was a contributing factor in most of the late twentieth century famines, and adds if today’s famines are studied, one of the characteristics will almost certainly be the famine area is in a state in conflict (Cuny 1999, 3-4). This suggests any attempt to provide HA in a CHE will require operations in a hostile environment unless significant diplomatic efforts prevail. Interventions conducted by the U.S. in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Afghanistan all required HA in a hostile environment. War and famine will continue to occur somewhere in the world. This fact will inevitably beg the questions of whether or not to intervene in a sovereign state to conduct HA or to provide HA during other military operations. Intervention is a political decision. It will be made by the elected leadership and subsequently tasked to the military for execution. The more important question is how to accomplish the mission effectively.

HA is not a primary mission for military forces; rather, the military is only intended to assist those agencies with humanitarian expertise for a relatively short duration (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001, I-1). Because of this focus, the tasks assigned to the military must be consistent with its capabilities. Famine relief, like all military operations, requires a strategy to be effective. Two general options are available

for initial direction. These include conventional relief or counterfamine assistance (Cuny 1999, 1). Counterfamine assistance is an economic-based approach designed to maintain or rebuild the market structure (Cuny 1999, 44). This obviously requires a sophisticated level of humanitarian knowledge and experience and is therefore not usually within the military's capability. Conventional relief involves providing food aid to the victims. If military forces are tasked to actively provide HA, their efforts should be limited to this strategy.

“Military assets should be employed in a complex emergency intervention only when they enjoy a comparative advantage over other humanitarian actors” (Natsios 1997, 122). The military does, in fact, possess certain capabilities not found in other agencies. They enjoy a significant advantage in the area of logistics. Following are ten advantages the military has over NGOs in response to humanitarian operations:

1. Capability to provide services within twenty-four hours
2. Capability to serve remote areas of the world
3. Stockpiled emergency material and available facilities and personnel for operations
4. Ability to operate in a forceful and consensual political/military environment
5. Capability to secure logistical pipeline
6. Standing cadre of expertise in all aspects of logistical operations to include air traffic, ground runway repair, pilots, planners, and others
7. Robust communications and tracking mechanisms embedded in the system
8. Large fuel supply with ability to inject into the theater where necessary
9. Unique availability of aircraft with large cargo capabilities

10. Capability to run operation in maritime settings to include amphibious craft as well as surveillance, airdrops, and search and rescue to affected populations at sea (The Cuny Center 2002, 22-23).

Although all ten advantages are significant, there are capabilities listed above only the Air Force can provide. Multiple humanitarian publications stress the need to act in a timely manner. Like any military deployment, the capability to quickly transport supplies to anywhere in the world rests with the USAF. Quick reaction in remote locations or rapid global mobility is a core competency of the Air Force and a decided strength. The ability to operate in hostile and permissive environments is consistent with all branches of the military, but to do so without excessive risk to U.S. personnel favors air forces. Finally, large aircraft and the expertise to conduct airhead operations commonly reside in the Air Force. These are vital capabilities during the initial phases of a CHE, and the Air Force provides them when humanitarian agencies cannot.

Bosnia Case Study

Feasibility

The Air Force has the ability to project power anywhere in the world. It utilizes stealth technology to penetrate enemy defenses and precision weaponry to strike targets with accuracy. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms provide the war fighters with a plethora of near real time information, and air interdiction fighters ensure air supremacy. The Air Force is a proven combat power ready to respond and prosecute the air war when directed by the political leadership. In a hostile environment, there is always the need to establish air superiority, suppress enemy air defenses, strike military targets, and provide airborne command and control. This is the mission of the CAF, and it

remains consistent regardless of the reason for employment. CAF' assets are prepared to enter hostile environments to conduct their missions, and the HA mission does not alter the basic functions of the CAF. MAFs on the other hand conduct most of their missions on the periphery of a combat environment. While they are prepared to and do enter hostile areas to support combat forces, they have more recently been tasked to assume some risk to deliver humanitarian relief supplies.

The MAF is comprised of both inter-theater and intra-theater airlift assets. The intertheater aircraft include the C-141 Starlifter, the C-5 Galaxy, and the C-17 Globemaster III. These large aircraft are a strategic national asset with both a peacetime and a wartime mission. They provide the military with its rapid response capability in times of crisis or conflict. Their size and speed allow the rapid transport of critical personnel and equipment to the theater of operations. This generally involves movement from the U.S. to various regions of the world. These capabilities are further enhanced with the ability to refuel while in flight and airdrop equipment if necessary. Peacetime operations also involve worldwide employment of these assets; this is done on a daily basis to help sustain U.S. personnel around the globe. This mission is ever present, and must be continued during times of conflict. Although the U.S. possesses a large fleet of intertheater aircraft, the demands for their use is large and must be centrally controlled to ensure global requirements are met.

The C-141 is the oldest and smallest of the intertheater aircraft, with a payload capacity of approximately 70,000 pounds. For years it was the workhorse of the intertheater airlift community, but is now scheduled for retirement by 2006 due to aircraft age and airframe integrity. The C-5 has a similar appearance to the C-141 but is much

larger. The C-5 is the largest aircraft in the Air Force and one of the largest aircraft in the world. It has an approximate payload capacity of 270,000 pounds, and carries most of the Army's large oversized equipment. There are currently 126 C-5s in the Air Force inventory, and plans to enhance the aircraft engines and avionics will keep it flying for many years to come (U.S. Air Force 2003). The new plane in the inventory is the C-17. The Globemaster III entered service in 1993 and is still in production today. There have been 113 aircraft produced to date, with a contract to increase this number to 180 by 2008 (U.S. Air Force 2003). The C-17 has a cargo capacity of 170,000 pounds, but, more importantly, it bridges the gap between strategic and tactical airlift. Not only can this aircraft provide intercontinental airlift, it can execute many of the missions normally associated with an intratheater airlift aircraft.

The intratheater airlift mission is often referred to as tactical airlift. While the strategic assets listed above fly intercontinental missions, tactical airlift aircraft support operations within a given theater. The C-130 Hercules is the intratheater airlift aircraft in the USAF today. It was introduced in 1956 and several variants have been produced over the years. The one constant, however, is its ability to operate in austere, undeveloped locations. The Hercules is much smaller than the strategic airlift aircraft and designed to move personnel and cargo shorter distances around the theater of operations. It does not have an in-flight refueling capability and, therefore, has a limited range. This aspect influences the payload capability of the C-130. The maximum payload capacity is 42,000 pounds, however, there is always a tradeoff between the amount of fuel required for the mission and the weight of the payload required for delivery. The true strength of the C-130 is its versatility and sheer numbers. There are 514 C-130 aircraft assigned among the

USAF, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard, and their mission is primarily to focus on tactical employment (U.S. Air Force 2003). Although peacetime operations include some transportation of supplies, most missions involve extensive flight training to airdrop personnel and supplies while flying in formation. In addition, this training includes how to survive and operate in a hostile environment. The C-130 provides the capability to deliver supplies in a hostile environment; as mentioned above, the C-17 is developing this same capability in addition to its strategic mission. As the number of C-17s continues to increase, the capabilities of the USAF to conduct HA in a hostile environment will continue to mature.

The Air Force also has capabilities specific to HA. Airdropping supplies has always been a capability of tactical airlift, but the humanitarian mission in Bosnia required an alternative method. The freefall airdrop method was specifically developed for the delivery of HA. It eliminated the need for parachutes and became commonly known as the Tri-Wall Aerial Delivery System or TRIADS. TRIADS is essentially a cardboard box tethered to the inside of the aircraft. It is designed to be filled with prepackaged meals and released over the target area, using gravity to extract the boxes from the cargo compartment of the aircraft. When the box leaves the plane, the tethered line rips it open, allowing the packaged meals to freefall to the ground.

This airdrop method was used extensively during OPP, but never exercised after the Bosnian airdrops terminated in 1994. Because the capability was never formalized, it was nearly lost as corporate knowledge of the ad hoc procedures dispersed throughout the Air Force. In 1999, the method was resurrected for OAF in Kosovo. Although TRIADS was never employed by the Air Force in Kosovo, the intent to use this method spawned

formal testing and procedural development. The material and procedures continued to evolve after Kosovo, and TRIADS was used to airdrop over 2.5 million food packages from C-17s in 2001 for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, there is still only limited documentation of the procedures. FM 4-20.147, *Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment: Humanitarian Airdrop*, is a dual-Service (Army and Air Force) publication released in November 2003. Although this manual sounds like the necessary doctrine to support this thesis, it only details the rigging procedures for preparing the humanitarian airdrop loads for delivery. What these airdrop loads contain, however, demonstrates another significant asset developed specifically for HA by the military.

Meals, ready-to-eat were the first prepackaged meals dropped using TRIADS but were replaced during OPP with the humanitarian daily ration (HDR). The need for the HDR was identified by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency-Humanitarian Assistance/Demining Activities (DSCA-HA/D) and developed to specifically feed moderately malnourished displaced populations. Its contents are ethnically sensitive and nutritionally balanced to provide a full day of sustenance, with at least 2,200 calories per meal. In addition to specific nutritional requirements, the HDR packaging is required to withstand extreme temperatures and ground impact from airdrop altitudes (Defense Logistics Agency 2003). The HDR is now a mainstay of military relief operations, and TRIADS provides a method of delivery. These two enablers and the tactical mission capabilities of the Air Force C-130 and C-17 aircraft facilitate participation in HA. Clearly, using the USAF is feasible because of the capabilities it provides.

Acceptability

Military airlift aircraft are not unique to the U.S., but the quantity of assets in the USAF fleet far exceeds the numbers in other nations. With a preponderance of airlift assets, U.S. aircraft are generally tasked to participate in humanitarian operations, and Air Force units are traditionally tasked well before U.S. ground troops. This was true in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In addition, UN forces are generally committed to a CHE when U.S. forces are not. The reluctance to commit U.S. ground forces to a hostile environment to facilitate HA suggests the risk is simply too great (Durch and Schear 1996, 200). Acceptable use of the military rests largely in the motivation and conviction of political leadership. They must determine if the financial and military cost of employing forces is worth the benefit and focus the effort. “If U.S. policymakers decide to intervene in a complex crisis for humanitarian purposes, the mission given the military must be defined and achievable. It must also include a strategy for extrication and some nonmilitary measurable indicators of success” (Natsios 1997, 117).

The concept of a pol-mil plan was first introduced in President Clinton’s PDD 56. It was included in the joint HA publication, but the actual components of the plan were only summarized. Although PDD 56 has not been completely adopted by the Bush administration, the pol-mil plan is an excellent tool to determine if and how to commit forces for HA.

The National Defense University agrees with this assessment and included it in its *Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations Handbook* produced in 2003. Pol-mil planning should be accomplished when multiple U.S. agencies are providing resources to support U.S. government objectives, and according to the

handbook, it ensures the government “develops coordinated policy guidance for the operation” (National Defense University 2003, 10). Although all potential agency representatives assist in the development of the pol-mil plan, implementation resides with the U.S. government. Committing assets to a CHE is largely based on the information developed and evaluated using this tool, and whether or not the U.S. government finds it acceptable. The following eleven components of the pol-mil plan drive an analytical assessment of an impending CCO to ensure the response is effective, integrated, and executable. Although important information is gleaned by every component listed below, the first eight determine if the military should participate, the extent of their role, and how to shape the conditions necessary for redeployment.

1. Situation Assessment
2. U.S. Interests
3. Mission Statement
4. Objectives
5. Desired Pol-Mil End State
6. Concept of Operations
7. Lead Agency Responsibilities
8. Transition and Exit Strategy
9. Organizational Concept
10. Preparatory Tasks
11. Functional Element Tasks (National Defense University 2003, 11).

OPP was initiated by the U.S. government to provide humanitarian relief by air for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This operation evolved into the longest running humanitarian airlift mission in Air Force history, and included both airland and airdrop missions in a hostile environment. OPP will be evaluated using the first eight components of the pol-mil plan framework above to determine if the decision to commit Air Force assets for humanitarian operations in a hostile environment was acceptable. The analysis begins with a situation assessment to establish the environment.

In the summer of 1991, the former Yugoslavia fractured along ethnic lines when the provinces of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Serbian-controlled government. Almost immediately, the Yugoslavian National Army, comprised mainly of Serbians, attacked to reclaim the two provinces and stop the secession. Fighting continued primarily between Serbia and Croatia for the rest of the year until a cease-fire was achieved by the European Community (Durch and Schear 1996, 200). Throughout the conflict, population displacements and ethnic atrocities created a growing humanitarian crisis, but the U.S. resisted involvement. Political leaders were not prepared to risk forces in what appeared to be a long and deadly struggle (Durch and Schear 1996, 200). The UN, however, did commit ground troops in early 1992 to establish conditions for a lasting peace. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) entered Croatia to conduct a traditional peacekeeping mission, and the Yugoslavian National Army used their arrival to disengage and depart. The Krajina Serbs, however, lived in and controlled northwest Croatia and were not prepared to submit to Croatian rule. Eventually, the internal conflict was settled militarily, and the Krajina Serbs were expelled from Croatia.

Bosnia, in the meantime, sank into hostilities in 1992, and the battle lines among the three ethnic belligerents were much less defined (Durch and Schear 1996, 223-225).

Like Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia, with a Muslim-led government, sought independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. Although the majority of the population in Bosnia is Muslim, there is also a significant number of Serbians and Croats living in the province. The Bosnian Serbs were not about to live under Muslim rule, and Bosnian Croats were not comfortable living in Bosnia without representation (Durch and Schear 1996, 225). Fighting consumed the country, and it was not long before press reports of mass murder and ethnic cleansing made headlines. As society crumbled in Bosnia, the need for action became more and more obvious. Enemy troops isolated civilian concentrations, and attempts to deliver humanitarian aid by NGOs were routinely intercepted. Despite several diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, deep-seated ethnic differences were too much to overcome without significant external pressure.

UNPROFOR entered Bosnia from Croatia on a mission to save lives. Its peacekeeping mission changed with UN Resolutions 770 and 776, passed in response to the mounting humanitarian emergency. Resolution 770 called for all states to take whatever measures in their power to provide or facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Resolution 776 called for UNPROFOR to officially provide protection for all HA activities (Durch and Schear 1996, 228-229).

As early as 1992, the focus of UN operations in Bosnia was clearly on humanitarian operations and the need to facilitate the delivery of aid. A key challenge was to gain access to the Sarajevo airport. Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, is a predominately Muslim city. Bosnian Serbs besieged the city early in the conflict and

proceeded to choke off supplies. To keep the city alive, UNPROFOR had to negotiate control of the airport and a corridor from the airport into the city. Negotiated terms were usually temporary in the Balkans, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated to really secure the airport would require 60,000 to 120,000 ground troops. In addition, an estimated 400,000 troops were required to stop the fighting in all of Bosnia and secure the region (Durch and Schear 1996, 227-228). Committing this quantity of troops was not an option for the U.S. government, and despite the headlines detailing atrocities; it resisted the impulse to intervene.

Eventually as the conflict grew more lethal, the U.S. was forced to take note. Unlike the public sentiment about Croatia, where the two nations were deemed evenly matched, television images of a suffering population captured in Bosnia created a swell of public outrage toward the belligerents. The U.S. could no longer stand by and avoid taking some sort of action (Durch and Schear 1996, 200). With UN forces technically in control of the Sarajevo airport and the U.S. government unwilling to deploy any ground troops, the only acceptable way to provide assistance was by committing airlift aircraft to deliver HA. OPP became the acceptable solution. This venture was initiated under the Bush administration in response to UN resolution 770 and the mounting pressure to provide assistance. It began in 1992, and was initially only an airhead mission into the Sarajevo airport to deliver humanitarian supplies to the besieged capital. On a strategic scale, however, it demonstrated U.S. willingness to assist European allies.

As indicated above, U.S. reluctance to become involved in this region suggests there was little or no U.S. interest in Bosnia. Although concerned about events in Europe, the U.S. government hoped the European Community would be able to police its

backyard without the U.S. military as indicated by the long delay for action. It had only been a year since the massive effort to liberate Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, and the U.S. military was still in the process of establishing a presence in the Middle East. Bosnia, however, required attention, and the stability of Europe is very much in the interest of the U.S. due to political and strategic relationships in this region (Natsios 1997, 136). To the public, it might seem the U.S. interest in Bosnia was largely based on taking the moral high ground. Indeed, the newly elected Clinton administration focused much of its foreign policy on protecting human rights. In fact, military intervention in the name of human rights has since become commonly referred to as the “Clinton Doctrine.” The media acquainted Americans with Bosnia when most people barely knew its location. The atrocities were terrible and intervention seemed imperative, but the number of troops required was simply too great and the environment too dangerous to risk committing ground forces in Bosnia. The alternative proved to be air forces. Despite the presence of surface-to-air threats, action in the air was definitely less risky than action on the ground. Employing the Air Force was an acceptable action to alleviate human suffering without accepting undue risk. “The U.S. government will not likely initiate a humanitarian intervention requiring troops if that seriously compromises the geostrategic interests of the United States or risks a U.S. military defeat” (Natsios 1997, 115).

In 1993, the Clinton administration now occupied the White House, and the U.S. policy toward Bosnia became decidedly more influential. The new president sought to establish American leadership in Bosnia and adopted a broader mission in the region, to include humanitarian airdrops to isolated areas. The objectives to support this new policy included: (1) supplementing HA to besieged enclaves; (2) enhancing U.S. credibility in

the Bosnia peace negotiations; (3) inducing the Bosnian government to return to ongoing peace negotiations; and (4) encouraging Bosnian Serbs to ease restrictions on overland relief convoys (Lidy et al. 1999, I-15). Three of the four objectives are clearly motivated by political, as opposed to humanitarian, considerations. Although the airdrop missions did provide much needed assistance to certain areas within Bosnia, use of Air Force aircraft answered the political agenda by showing effective action by the U.S. government. For the cost involved, this use of the Air Force to shape public opinion is without a doubt acceptable. This is especially true considering how little military effort the U.S. had invested in the crisis to date. The commitment, however, was to support the HA mission currently being accomplished by humanitarian agencies.

As the lead humanitarian agency, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) coordinated ground delivery of food and supplies throughout Bosnia until belligerents began to interdict convoys bound for locations in need. Without a means of delivering HA via the normal ground routes, UNHCR requested assistance from the joint task force (JTF) for OPP. To facilitate the subsequent airdrops, UNHCR prioritized areas in need from information received by imbedded staff members in the enclaves. It also coordinated with air planners to ensure airdrops were executable in these areas, and with UNPROFOR to hopefully gain support from the local governments. Finally, it arranged for the donation of relief supplies with other NGOs and donor nations. These steps preceded each formal request for an airdrop mission from the JTF, which, in turn, tasked the air component commander to plan and execute the mission. For what appears to be a fairly straightforward concept of operations, its implementation was actually quite complex due to ground threats and integration

challenges. Nevertheless, Air Force operations responded to the requests of the UNHCR and provided HA in a hostile environment until a peace accord could be brokered (Lidy et al. 1999, II-1-II-2).

The existence of small arms, anti-aircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missiles forced air planners to mitigate the threat to air operations. To do so, they elected to conduct all airdrops at night and from an altitude at least 10,000 feet above the ground. This tactic would hopefully mitigate the risks to aircrews and still allow for accuracy. Fortunately, despite many reported instances of ground fire, not a single U.S. aircraft was lost, although an Italian aircraft was shot down near Sarajevo. As for accuracy, the Air Force required aircraft equipped with radar capable of updating their navigation computer to lead all missions. At the end of the operation, the military reported an eighty-five-percent success rate. Although observers on the ground suggest eighty-five percent is questionable, no other agency has published a quantitative report to the contrary (Lidy et al. 1999, III-15). In either case, the conditions to warrant an arbitrary end to the mission were established.

Military units always stress the need for a desired endstate to frame their mission and prevent it from continually expanding to include more or different missions. Not establishing an endstate for OPP was a frustrating matter for the military leadership at the outset of airdrops. It was, in fact, considered the most significant obstacle by the JTF. For eighteen months, airdrop missions were executed in a hostile Bosnia each night with no measure of success or failure to determine when enough had been done. In January 1994, airdrops reached a peak of sixteen sorties per night before tapering off in the spring. When they ended in the summer of 1994, no endstate had been established, and yet the

UNHCR still considered airdrops to be an available future option if necessary (Lidy et al. 1999, II-19-II-20). For ground troops this could have been catastrophic, but for air forces, it was less significant. Where missions originate and end is an inherent advantage of the Air Force. Planes, equipment, and personnel are usually deployed to locations outside the area of conflict. Because of this, the challenges of withdrawal and extraction do not afflict the Air Force in the same manner they do ground forces deployed within an embattled state. As demonstrated by the airdrop portion of OPP, it can be simply initiated and ended with little risk to military forces. Although not an ideal arrangement, it is much more acceptable to do this with air units vice ground units.

Without a clearly defined end state, it is difficult to establish a baseline to either transition to another phase of operation or exit altogether. To exit after committing ground forces, the only real options are to establish a lasting peace or leave without resolution and let the conflict continue. From a humanitarian aspect, the military needs to establish the conditions for humanitarian agencies to take over and resume its operations with some level of security. The decision to use the Air Force to deliver HA allowed OPP to continue without risk to U.S. ground forces. The U.S. remained actively engaged in Bosnia until a diplomatic solution could be achieved, and until ground forces could begin peace enforcement operations. This, in essence, became the transition strategy for OPP. The Dayton Agreement signed in December 1995, forced the end of hostilities and, among other things, accounted for refugees and internally displaced people. This proved to be both an effective and acceptable transition strategy in lieu of deploying an extensive combat ground force during hostilities. Bosnia is now relatively stable and the military has transitioned to a traditional peacekeeping operation.

The pol-mil plan helped to determine if a U.S. military response in Bosnia was warranted. In addition, it provided a guideline to help determine an acceptable force for commitment. Given the longtime U.S. interest in Europe and the government objective to enhance its credibility, some sort of response was required. This fact stemmed from a thorough analysis of the situation. Civilians were isolated by hostile forces, targeted for persecution, and at risk of starvation. Humanitarian agencies repeatedly attempted to reach the enclaves, but their ground convoys were routinely intercepted and denied access. Food, water, and supplies became scarce, and an alternative was deemed necessary by the UNHCR and the U.S. The threat situation on the ground was perilous, and despite the need to respond, ground forces were not the answer. The quantity required to secure Bosnia was determined to be massive, and the risks on the ground proved very dangerous. In the end, the acceptable use of the Air Force in Bosnia was primarily due to risk. It offered an option to both reach isolated pockets of civilians and do so at a reduced level of risk. It could be tailored daily to meet delivery needs and turned on and off at will to facilitate a speedy transition when diplomatic efforts achieved a viable peace. The Air Force provided the perfect response for the U.S. government. It was an acceptable use of forces for HA in a hostile environment.

Suitability

“Military assets should be employed in a complex emergency intervention only when they enjoy a comparative advantage over other humanitarian actors” (Natsios 1997, 122). This principle suggests there are suitable conditions and times to use the military to provide HA. This last area of analysis will determine if it is suitable for the Air Force to conduct HA in a hostile environment.

Although there is no official government documentation to determine suitability, the Mohonk criteria offer a generic guideline for HA in a CHE. They describe a desired or recommended role of political leaders, humanitarian actors, and military forces and outline when and how each should be employed. Political decision makers must provide leadership, encourage and support diplomacy, and act early to begin resolution. Humanitarian actors must provide relief to sustain life, transition to sustainable development, and strengthen local authorities to build self-reliance. The basic tenets governing HA are also emphasized. These include impartiality, neutrality, independence, and empowerment. Based on these tenets alone, it does not seem likely the military can act in a humanitarian role when committed to action in a CCO. PO under a UN mandate may provide the authority to mitigate violence, but any projection of military force may be perceived by some NGOs to lack both impartiality and neutrality. Ironically, impartiality is fundamental to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999, I-10). Even though U.S. military intentions may be entirely humanitarian, the capability to intervene with force may undermine the humanitarian effort due to incorrect perceptions (Wolfson and Wright 1995, 5.1). For this reason, some humanitarians are reluctant to incorporate military HA unless absolutely necessary.

This sentiment is consistent with the Mohonk criteria, and it outlines the appropriate military response to a CHE. According to the criteria, the military should: (1) be used only as a last resort; (2) be employed in exceptional circumstances to protect, support, and deliver humanitarian relief; (3) be used sparingly because of its disproportionate human and financial cost; (4) comply with decisions of the appropriate

international civilian authority; and (5) respect the independence and freedom of movement of humanitarian organizations (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996, J-5). Although they allow for the delivery of humanitarian relief, the Mohonk criteria seem to suggest military forces are not a suitable means of providing HA. They actually imply any use of the military in a CCO is for the protection of HA as opposed to actually providing HA.

The first criterion clearly spells out when a military option should be used for HA. It should only be committed as a last resort after extinguishing all other options. This is a strong stand by the authors of these criteria and actually a very good policy.

The Mohonk criteria include actions by political leaders and humanitarians, and these elements have important roles to play in a CHE. By using the military only as a last resort, the authors discourage attempts to immediately resort to a military response in lieu of pursuing these other actions. Mohonk justifies this by pointing out the limitation of the military to address the root causes of the crisis, and stresses HA must extend beyond just relief and seek to foster self-reliance. It must facilitate repatriation for the victims and reconstruction and rehabilitation for the society as a whole (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996). As mentioned earlier, this type of humanitarian strategy is well beyond the abilities of the Air Force. The ability to conduct extensive HA justifiably lies within the purview of humanitarian agencies, and it would be foolish for the Air Force to duplicate the effort. The Air Force, however, does have the capability to deliver emergency relief supplies rapidly and to remote locations.

The Mohonk criteria call for humanitarians to first and foremost provide relief on the basis of need and in sufficient quantity and duration to sustain life. This begs the

question: Can military forces be humanitarians? The answer to this question is as complex as the emergencies creating this debate. This thesis has already identified two specifically Air Force operations initiated purely for humanitarian reasons. The Berlin Airlift and OPP both provided relief on the basis of need and in the necessary quantity to sustain life. The unique aspect of these operations is they managed to provide HA when other agencies could not. The desired humanitarian strategy to attack the root causes of famine and develop self-reliance does not replace the initial requirement to provide conventional relief until more robust programs are developed (Cuny 1999, 45). The Air Force brought supplies into a besieged Sarajevo when political and humanitarian actions could no longer sustain it. When other agencies have exhausted their options, the Air Force has unique capabilities and meets the suitability test of the first criterion.

“Although military intervention should not be the first resort, the earlier it is invoked, the better” (Natsios 1997, 119).

In response to the ever-growing number of Bosnians in need of assistance and the inability to reach all of them via ground routes, the U.S. initiated humanitarian airdrops to various regions in Bosnia. Not surprisingly, this decision was not wholly accepted as a suitable operation. Despite UNHCR endorsement, other participants were opposed to the venture. UNPROFOR leadership suggested the airdrops might have put soldiers in and around the enclaves at risk to attacks. The Department of Defense did not want airdrops to pave the way for a larger military intervention. Even the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance argued airdrops were an ineffective option. They would be accepted as an adequate response to avoid better ground options (Lidy et al. 1999, I-17). Nevertheless, humanitarian airdrops began on 28 February 1993 in response to UN

Resolution 770. Based on the fourth criterion of the Mohonk agreement, the use of the Air Force to conduct HA was suitable.

The UN is widely accepted as the international authority and the U.S. responded appropriately to its resolution. The humanitarian airdrops lasted for eighteen months in conjunction with Air Force assets already supplying Sarajevo with life-sustaining relief. They were focused on twelve specific enclaves to meet the immediate needs of isolated civilians cut off by belligerent forces (Lidy et al. 1999, I-9). Food accounted for ninety-four percent of the airdropped relief supplies, with the remaining missions providing medicine, winterization supplies, and seeds (Lidy et al. 1999, II-15).

According to the third criterion, use of the military has high human and financial cost and should be minimized. Delivery of relief by air is by far the most expensive means available. As such, humanitarian agencies are reluctant to use aircraft when sea and ground options exist. The OPP cost estimate for the airdrop missions was conservatively \$2,800 per ton delivered (Lidy et al. 1999, II-21). Compared to the cost of a truck at \$25 per ton delivered, using aircraft to provide HA is clearly not a cost effective way to provide relief (Cuny 1999, 108). Arguably, the financial costs are not the most important means of meeting the third criterion. It is ironic humanitarian agencies even question the cost of using military aircraft to deliver supplies. When tasked by the U.S. government, those costs are absorbed by the military operation and maintenance budget or paid by appropriated government funds. According to Mr. Cuny, while airlift is impractical and expensive, if someone else is paying for the aircraft, they should be used to benefit the mission (Cuny 1999, 110).

For the U.S. government, the real benefit of using the Air Force for this mission was to avoid the unacceptably high cost of human life. The ground war in Bosnia entailed fierce and heavy fighting. By flying above this activity, HA was continually delivered without loss of life. The American public will not stand for the loss of its soldiers for a cause without clearly defined U.S. interests. The Air Force is a suitable option to this reality, and therefore drastically reduces the more important human cost of criterion three.

From 1992 to 1996, the airlift missions into Sarajevo Airport provided approximately 160,500 tons of relief supplies. Although the time frame was shorter, the airdrop mission from 1993 to 1994 only delivered approximately 18,000 tons of supplies (Lidy et al. 1999, 3, III-1). These missions, however, were a unique response to an otherwise untenable situation. The suitability of OPP airdrops cannot only be measured by quantity of tons dropped. If tonnage were the only criterion for success, this form of HA would never pass the suitability test. The second Mohonk criterion is to employ the military only in exceptional circumstances. This is actually an inherent strength of the Air Force. The true capability of airlift is to provide relief where other options are not available or are inadequate. “The movement of food is the major factor determining the success of a famine-relief operation during a war” (Cuny 1999, 140), and although the airdrops augmented the meager land deliveries, there were locations where food drops were the only source of supply. For example, from October 1993 to March 1994, the only source of food, medicine, and winter supplies for the town of Maglaj came from the humanitarian airdrop missions. Over 2,000 tons were airdropped to the people trapped in Maglaj, and according to the U.S. Center for Disease Control; there were no signs of

malnutrition when officials finally entered the enclave in March (Lidy et al. 1999, III-1). Maglaj was a concentrated Air Force effort for an exceptional circumstance with a fortunate outcome. Use of the Air Force was clearly a suitable option based on this criterion.

Because famine does not develop overnight, humanitarian agencies can predict where help will be required long before a CHE fully develops. This allows them to respond early and hopefully make agreements with the local governing body to facilitate the delivery of HA. The UNHCR was operating in Bosnia and coordinating the efforts of other agencies well before military involvement. It had established a fairly accurate assessment of the needs and locations of the people and was actively engaged in meeting those needs. When its' capabilities were interrupted by belligerents, the UNHCR requested help from the military.

The fifth Mohonk criterion calls for the military to respect the independence and freedom of movement of humanitarian organizations. Although not necessarily a case for suitability, the Air Force met this in two ways. As the lead HA agency in Bosnia, the UNHCR identified and prioritized airdrop locations. The JTF leadership accepted its proposals and approved them for execution based primarily on risk analysis. By coordinating with the lead agency and responding to its requests, the Air Force was not viewed as a dominating force over the UNHCR and the latter's independence remained unfettered.

The second benefit of the Air Force is its footprint or basing architecture. Because it is transient by nature, the Air Force does not infuse thousands of airmen into a conflict on the ground. Therefore, it will not restrict humanitarian agency operations. Assets fly in

to deliver supplies and out again, leaving the HA environment to the NGOs on the ground. This allows NGOs the freedom to pursue their objectives without military-imposed restrictions. This arrangement actually benefits the Air Force. Information from NGO close coordination helps with the delivery of HA. They are better able to assess the situation and provide the USAF with the quantity of HA required and the specific locations for delivery. If the military is involved, the Air Force is a very suitable option for criterion five.

Although not always perfect, the Air Force sustained operations to move food to those in need. Over ten million meals, ready-to-eat and nearly two million HDRs were dropped to innocent civilians in Bosnia (Lidy et al. 1999, II-22). It was a lengthy operation for the Air Force, and ideally an alternative method would have been developed by humanitarian experts. The reality, however, is hostile environments are rarely predictable, and occasionally military capabilities must be leveraged to provide at least some level of relief. The Air Force met all five of the Mohonk military criteria, and assuming some HA is better than no HA, leveraging the Air Force airdrop capability was a suitable use of their assets.

Kosovo Case Study

The second case study of this thesis also involves military operations in the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo is a small province in southern Yugoslavia, and like the provinces to the north, the people of Kosovo wanted independence from the Serbian-controlled state. This wish to secede has long been a goal for the people of Kosovo due to both ethnic and religious differences. The majority of its inhabitants are neither Slavic nor Orthodox. Kosovo's population is comprised predominately of ethnic Albanians with

Muslim beliefs and a different language. The conflict in Kosovo did not begin with the fall of communism, although it did trigger the events leading to a CHE. This region of Yugoslavia has been a bed of contention for many years. The continual struggle for independence gained Kosovo autonomy in 1974 under Marshal Tito but following his death in 1980, protests in the province verged on revolution. Serbia was not about to relinquish its territorial claim on Kosovo. It had occupied Kosovo long before the ethnic Albanians, and its significance stems mainly from the 1389 Battle of Kosovo with the Ottoman Turks. Although a defeat for Serbia, this battle and its participants are immortalized in Serbian culture. In the name of religion and national freedom, Serbian forces bravely fought the superior Ottoman Empire and fell. Serbian history is centered on Kosovo, and it is considered the holiest of lands. Maintaining control of Kosovo was an imperative for Serbia. So in 1986, the Yugoslavian National Army moved into the region to quell protests, and in 1989 its' autonomy was revoked by Slobodan Milosevic (Campbell 1999, 152). In the early 1990s, hope for independence was renewed with the events in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Kosovo had hoped to be included in the Dayton Accord deliberations, and when largely ignored, tensions in the region began to turn to more aggressive approaches.

The Kosovo Liberation Army was more or less a band of ethnic Albanian guerilla fighters determined to win independence for Kosovo. Although no match for the Serbian military, they made international headlines by conducting attacks on Serbian forces in February 1998 (Campbell 1999, 153). Serbia, of course, responded with force and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo became subject to the wanton death and destruction of civil war. The U.S. government engaged in diplomatic efforts to end hostilities, but to no avail.

By the fall of 1998, thousands of civilians had already fled the country as Serbian forces rolled through the villages of Kosovo (Lambeth 2001, 6). In response to Serbia's continued aggression, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199 in September 1998. In addition to calling for a cease-fire to begin negotiations for a peaceful settlement, it demanded action to improve the humanitarian situation. It also demanded Serbia allow for the resettlement of IDPs and refugees, and the unimpeded movement of humanitarian organizations to facilitate recovery. From a humanitarian perspective, the UN had recognized the severity of the crisis and taken the diplomatic and legal steps to provide relief. The international response remained to be seen.

The war in Kosovo was decisively in favor of Serbian forces from a standpoint of military strength. The Serbian Army and police forces occupied Kosovo in much greater numbers and with more lethal equipment than the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army forces. Left to their own defenses, the Kosovo Liberation Army and ethnic Albanians would have been forcibly removed from Kosovo without external support. On 24 March 1999, NATO air forces attacked the sovereign state of Yugoslavia in yet another venture of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Ironically, the bombing campaign exacerbated the refugee problem, and the UNHCR officially asked for help with the HA mission on 3 April (Porter 2003). The USAF responded immediately with HA deliveries on 5 April, and NATO officially commenced Operation Allied Harbour on 16 April to coordinate relief efforts. NATO's combat aircraft continued to bomb targets in Kosovo and Serbia for seventy-eight days to end the aggressive actions of Serbian ground forces. By the end of the conflict, nearly one million refugees had left Kosovo and hundreds of thousands of IDPs remained homeless within the province.

The FAS test will again be used to determine if committing the Air Force was an appropriate response to the growing catastrophe in Kosovo. Feasibility will focus on Air Force airlift capability, and the suitability test will include the Mohonk criteria. These areas will be evaluated prior to exploring acceptability. With respect to Kosovo, the limitations of the Air Force to provide HA within the province are primarily centered on acceptability. Because of this, that portion of analysis will be addressed at the end of this case study. A pol-mil plan will be recreated to detail the environment and show why the U.S. committed forces to action.

Feasibility

The feasibility of only using air forces to compel Milosevic to capitulate is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, to use them to conduct HA is pertinent to this study. The capabilities of the available U.S. airlift aircraft for Kosovo were very similar to those of Bosnia with two important exceptions. The newly acquired C-17 had been produced in sufficient numbers to augment the more prevalent C-130. Although the tactical airdrop capabilities of its aircrews were limited due to training, the C-17 was available to deliver aid to forward locations. In addition, the defensive systems on both aircraft were more advanced to combat infrared missile threats, and most of the C-130s available in the European theater also had defensive systems for radar missile threats. After resurrecting the knowledge and obtaining the resources to conduct the TRIADS mission, the delivery capabilities of the airlift aircraft were actually enhanced over those present for Bosnia. If required, it would be a feasible option for providing HA pending a suitable alternative.

Suitability

Suitability will again be evaluated using the Mohonk criteria for military actions. Although the first criterion is to use the military only as a last resort, the severity of the situation in and around Kosovo, in addition to the rapid escalation of the crisis, warranted early military involvement. Just one week after the NATO bombing campaign was initiated, the U.S. State Department issued a situation report detailing the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. It stated an estimated 100,000 additional ethnic Albanians had become displaced, bringing the total number of refugees and IDPs to an estimated 600,000 (Department of State 1999). Although the U.S. had considered the necessity to provide HA in conjunction with the air war, it incorrectly assessed where the requirement would be needed. The initial assumptions were focused on what was believed to be primarily an IDP problem. Prewar estimates included one million IDPs, who would remain relatively inaccessible, with very few refugees actually departing Kosovo. In reality, the displacement of civilians proved to be both internal and external. Efforts by Serbian forces to expel the ethnic Albanians from their homes created an unforeseen exodus. Although many did remain inside the confines of Kosovo, a much larger number than expected sought refuge in neighboring countries. This unforeseen development caught the U.S. government and humanitarian agencies by surprise, and they were unprepared to deal with the large number of refugees arriving daily (Blanton 2000, annex 1, 1-2).

The crisis was indeed mounting, and it was not limited to the confines of Kosovo. There was a genuine concern for the stability of Albania and Macedonia. These nations had been clinging to fragile republics since the end of the cold war, and the massive influx of refugees threatened their viability. Security concerns forced Macedonia to stop

thousands at the border and refuse entry. It had placed a 60,000-person limit on refugees from Kosovo, and the failure of UNHCR, NGOs, or the U.S. government to coordinate for greater access required assets to transport thousands of “trapped” refugees to other locations until negotiations could improve the situation (Blanton 2000, annex 1, 1-2). The scope of the crisis rapidly overwhelmed humanitarian agencies working in and around Kosovo. They lacked comprehensive leadership and the resources to provide adequate relief, and the military was required to react. Faced with the impending crisis, the UNHCR officially asked for and received help from NATO. Suffice it to say; the second criterion of Mohonk requiring military action only in exceptional circumstances was met.

The remaining criteria focus on the costs of using the military, compliance with international authority, and respect for the freedom of humanitarian organizations. Although important considerations, they were definitely overshadowed by the impending humanitarian catastrophe. Millions of dollars were donated by NATO and non-member nations alike to provide food, tents, medicine, and others. In addition, military assets erected refugee camps, provided security, and sustained the camps with both air and ground transportation assets. The massive flow of refugees demanded support, and NATO responded with Operation Allied Harbour. Nearly 8,000 troops from NATO were provided to support and assist the efforts of UNHCR (Global Security 2003). As refugees streamed across the borders, the estimates of IDPs continued to grow and the need for HA to be provided within Kosovo became more pronounced. Despite the demands of UN Resolution 1199 for the freedom of movement for humanitarian agencies, Serbian forces were delaying and redirecting HA convoys (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1998).

Acceptability

Even a cursory evaluation of the pol-mil planning guidelines suggests the use of Air Force assets for HA was an acceptable response for the U.S. government. Accepting the risk to do so within the hostile confines of Kosovo, however, presented a problem. The very purpose of operations in Kosovo was to stop the hostilities creating the humanitarian crisis, but how to accomplish this was a matter for the members of NATO to decide. Much like Bosnia, the U.S. hoped the European community would solve the problems in Kosovo, but when diplomatic efforts failed, NATO elected to use combat force. The nineteen member nations agreed only to use air strikes to stop Serbian aggression for two reasons. The first was due to the terrain in Kosovo and its impact on the ability to support and sustain ground troops. The second, and more political, was the unwillingness of the U.S. and its NATO allies to experience combat casualties (Lambeth 2001, 12). Because the threat of force was a part of diplomatic negotiations, NATO had to respond to retain credibility. Without the willingness to risk ground forces, airpower became the acceptable response.

OAF was the first combat operation of NATO since it was established, and the pressure to be successful was felt by every member. This, in essence, was the U.S. interest for committing air forces for operations. President Clinton confirmed this in a press statement on the first day of the air war. He stated his first objective for air strikes was “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression, and its support for peace” (The White House 1999). The outcome of OAF could determine the future of NATO. If the alliance was unable to successfully stop Serbian forces, it would certainly lose its prestige and credibility as a viable military force. The assets for the HA effort

were equally important to this effort. International and public support for the combat operation had to be maintained, and the humanitarian crisis was very prevalent in the media. The financial costs of committing airlift forces were more than acceptable to show U.S. commitment to the plight of the refugees and foster support for the combat effort.

The U.S. commitment included 1,000 personnel under Operation Allied Harbour to primarily establish air operations in Tirana, Albania to receive and distribute relief supplies. It was known as JTF Shining Hope and was established to support international organizations, the U.S. government and NGO agencies providing relief for the Kosovar refugees in Albania and Macedonia. The mission included the delivery of HDRs, water, tents, and medicine, and it became known as Operation Sustain Hope. Its objectives were to simply maintain regional stability and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe from occurring as a result of offensive operations in Kosovo (Global Security 2003). This was consistent with NATO's overall objectives provided by Secretary General, Doctor Javier Solana. He announced the objectives of the entire intervention were first to prevent more human suffering, repression, and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo; second, to prevent instability spreading in the region; and third to end the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Kosovo (Solana 1999). The objectives of OAF and JTF Shining Hope both necessitated the HA mission. Given the decision to use only air forces to accomplish this mission implies the political leadership felt it an acceptable response.

JTF Shining Hope was inextricably linked to OAF, and as long as the air campaign continued, a military presence would exist to provide HA. Therefore, the end state for the HA mission coincided with the goals of OAF. There were five required conditions to end the bombing campaign, and one of those was to allow refugees to return

to Kosovo. In addition, the necessary aid to provide immediate relief and reconstruction assistance had to be unhindered (Lambeth 2001, 10). This end state hinged on winning the air war but until this occurred; the Air Force would continue to deliver HA to Albania and Macedonia to provide for refugees. To this end, the Air Force developed a concept of operations to provide HA to refugees from Kosovo immediately after the air war began.

The acceptability of using the Air Force for this operation depended entirely on political acceptance of mission risk and much less on operating costs. The plan focused on using Tirana Rinas Airport and Durres Seaport in Albania. Both locations were required for mission success, and initial efforts were directed toward the airport. Tirana Rinas is an international airport in the capital city of Albania, but the infrastructure to support massive air operations for HA was entirely inadequate. Significant improvements were required to safely conduct air operations, to include enhancing security.

Even prior to the official establishment of Operation Allied Harbour, the U.S. deployed the necessary infrastructure to conduct HA flights into Albania. This initial action is indicative of the speed inherent to the Air Force and its ability to establish operations rapidly, and in relatively austere locations. Throughout the operation, air forces from nations around the world would deliver relief supplies for an estimated 850,000 refugees in Albania and Macedonia. The USAF alone contributed more than 500 airlift missions, delivering almost 3,100 tons of food, HDR, tents, bedding, medicine, and a variety of other relief supplies. In addition, three camps with a capacity to house 20,000 refugees were built under the supervision of Air Force engineer units (Department of Defense 2000, 103-104). The Air Force responded to the CHE in the Balkans and provided HA in conjunction with other humanitarian agencies under the lead of the

UNHCR. The airhead at Rinas Airport was critical to these operations and was therefore enhanced, managed, and secured by the USAF. Creating it was a monumental accomplishment, but the true challenge to the Air Force was to provide HA to IDPs still within Kosovo.

The humanitarian situation within Kosovo was primarily pieced together from the reports of refugees leaving the province. Many told of IDPs hiding in the mountains to escape the fighting without enough supplies to sustain them. Efforts to deliver aid via ground assets were intercepted by Serbian forces or redirected to alternate locations. The World Food Program had over a million HDRs ready to deliver, but could not reach the IDPs without security. They did, in fact, support the use of aircraft to airdrop food to the IDPs (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1999). Despite the required tasks to alleviate the suffering with HA, the ability to enter Serbian airspace with USAF airlift aircraft for this purpose was not considered possible. As stated earlier, the acceptability of using the Air Force for these operations was driven by the amount of risk necessary to accomplish the mission. Actions along the border and in nearby countries was acceptable. Operations into Kosovo with U.S. airlift aircraft were not acceptable to the decision makers due to the potential loss of American lives. After considering the situation and the potential outcome, an alternative was to incorporate diplomatic and contract efforts to provide assistance.

One of the initial goals of any air war is to achieve air superiority. In Kosovo the threat from Serbian aircraft was minimal, but the threat from surface-to-air radar missiles was very real. Airlift aircraft are relatively defenseless against this threat; therefore, the best way to conduct HA airdrop missions was to negotiate approval with Serbia. The U.S.

sought to fund these missions using hired or contract aircraft. The risks were still present, but attempts to mitigate this risk included informing Serbia of the humanitarian nature of their mission and having the UN negotiate safe passage (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1999). Without Serbian approval, two Russian-made Antonov aircraft from Moldova conducted humanitarian airdrops in early June. Fortunately, a peace agreement was signed on 9 June 1999, and the effort was no longer required.

Air forces were used exclusively to prosecute combat operations over Kosovo for OAF. Although not in direct support of OAF, JTF Shining Hope provided HA in what turned out to be the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. In addition to HA, it was a necessary use of military assets to help maintain public support. The Air Force could feasibly provide airlift to accomplish the mission, and it was a suitable response in light of the massive amount of refugees and the UNHCR request for help. If based solely on cost, the Air Force was an acceptable response because of the unwavering support for NATO to succeed. If based on risk, it was limited to the periphery of Kosovo. The same reason for using CAF in lieu of ground forces prevented the use of USAF HA airdrop mission in Kosovo. For this operation, the loss of an American life was an unacceptable risk, and the U.S. government considered airdrop missions extremely dangerous.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The four instruments of national power are diplomatic, information, military, and economic strength. All four instruments complement each other, and, as required, these sources of power are leveraged either collectively or individually to address crises. This includes response to a CHE. Ideally, diplomatic and economic actions will attain a desired peace, and provide assistance to those in need. Unfortunately, this historically has not always been the case. The Balkans presented the world with a CHE in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. They both required a military response to restore regional stability, and despite debate about national interests, the U.S. committed military forces to assist with humanitarian efforts. Because the decision to use the military will always come from political leadership, military leaders must provide sound advice to these politicians on the military capabilities available to support the mission. The source of this information resides in doctrine. Not only will doctrine influence and guide political decisions, it will ensure force preparation through training and procurement.

The U.S. Army has a detailed manual of operational and tactical doctrine for the conduct of HA by ground forces. Conversely, the USAF has neither a comprehensive operational doctrine nor the tactics, techniques, or procedural doctrine specific to the HA mission. It is currently not a fundamental mission for the Air Force and is commonly viewed as an exception to the norm. In reality however, recent history suggests the Air Force can be a prominent player in HA. It is feasible to commit Air Force assets to deliver aid. Airlift by its very nature is designed for this type of mission, and the U.S. has

many of these assets. It is also suitable to use the Air Force when conventional HA assets are inadequate or unavailable. This has occurred because of a hostile environment and when immediate relief was required. Finally, it is reasonable to presume the Air Force will continually be tasked to support or provide HA in future operations if the political leadership deems it an acceptable response to a CHE. The FAS test suggests the Air Force is a viable source for future HA missions, and it must be prepared for future taskings. In addition, to assist in its preparation, a more detailed Air Force doctrine warrants development.

Based purely on the quantity of airlift aircraft in the USAF, the government can justifiably commit the Air Force to support HA anywhere in the world. The larger intertheater aircraft, to include the C-5 Galaxy and the C-17 Globemaster III, are capable of delivering immediate supplies to major destinations around the world. Although the worldwide requirements placed on these assets prohibit their use for extended periods of time, they can provide desperately needed supplies during the initial phases of a CHE response. For long-term efforts, the C-130 Hercules is ideal for transporting supplies from major ports or storage sites to more remote or isolated areas. Their ability to carry large quantities of relief is limited by fuel requirements, but they can deploy to the necessary locations and conduct operations for an extended period of time. Another advantage is the sheer number of C-130s. Over 500 aircraft exist among the active duty and reserve component Air Force. It is entirely feasible to task these assets to initiate, augment, or replace HA efforts. Tasking the Air Force to provide HA in a hostile environment is also well within the purview of the political leadership.

The Air Force can provide both personnel and equipment to facilitate HA, but like any endeavor, to adequately conduct the entire mission requires interagency participation to leverage the necessary expertise. Humanitarian agencies possess this expertise, and do provide HA in many locations around the globe. They work to overcome the effects of a CHE by providing more than just food deliveries to an airport. They develop strategies to revitalize economies in addition to providing conventional relief. Local resources are used to the maximum extent possible to reestablish worth in the community. Labor is procured from the local population to build purchasing power. Wages paid to local workers are then used to buy the local resources previously unaffordable. Perhaps one of their more important efforts is to broker agreements with the government or unofficial leaders to allow the assistance to occur without hostile interference. If this is possible and subsequently successful, military intervention may be avoided altogether. If not, the inherent capabilities of the military to operate amid conflict might be necessarily applied to the CHE. The activities of humanitarian agencies promote long-term solutions to famine-stricken countries. The Air Force does not bring this same kind of expertise and capability. There is, however, a role well suited to the Air Force.

Even though counterfamine strategies are required to bring about real recovery, immediate relief is always required during the initial phases of a CHE. Conventional relief must provide at least a modicum of food to IDPs who have fled their homes due to hostilities or lack of resources. Based on the Mohonk criteria, the military should respond only in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort. These two criteria effectively limit the scope of military involvement, but, more importantly, they allow for the unique capabilities the Air Force has to offer. The rapid global projection capabilities of long-

range airlift aircraft allow relief to reach critical locations within days instead of weeks or months. The capability also exists to deliver assistance directly to remote sites via airdrop. Some humanitarian agencies, such as the UN World Food Program, have similar capabilities, but most agencies must negotiate contracts and agreements with civilian carriers to deliver supplies. This also assumes the supplies will be transported by air versus more economical sea or ground assets.

NGOs rely heavily on donated funding primarily from government sources. Spending a large portion of their budget to pay for airlift aircraft detracts from their ability to provide relief and spawn recovery. It is the most expensive means of transportation and not the preferred method for most humanitarian agencies. The Air Force is a suitable source of large aircraft when there is a need for rapid initial delivery or ground transportation is not possible. The hostile activities of belligerents in Bosnia created a condition requiring Air Force capabilities. In response to these circumstances, the Air Force conducted airdrop and airland missions to sustain Sarajevo and twelve additional isolated enclaves until ground operations could accommodate the demand for HA. The Air Force clearly proved to be a suitable response for HA in Bosnia. It met all five of the Mohonk military criteria and accomplished a mission no civilian agency was prepared to undertake. This was partially because of the financial costs of using airlift to deliver humanitarian aid but also due to the airdrop requirements. The Air Force was able to absorb the costs and the burden of executing the operation. For the U.S. however, the financial cost of conducting HA with military assets is far less restrictive than the political and military costs of losing personnel. Using the military to conduct HA in a hostile environment is therefore largely based on acceptable risk.

Detailed planning is a very important part of every military operation, to include HA. A major part of the planning process is to analyze all of the aspects of the mission and determine one or more courses of action. For the HA mission, this process is formalized by the pol-mil plan. It allows planners from political, military, and humanitarian agencies to assess a CHE, determine an acceptable response, and coordinate efforts. This process is surprisingly similar to the military decision-making process used by Army and Air Force planners. Although not completely adopted in joint doctrine, the pol-mil plan is an excellent tool to guide the political decision to use military forces for HA.

The acceptable use of military forces is determined by political leadership, and their agenda for committing forces may be based on any one or all of the four instruments of national power. Both national and international diplomatic interests may drive a decision to respond. The pol-mil plan identifies national interests and objectives as areas of assessment to determine acceptability. By targeting these areas for evaluation, planners determine why the U.S. should pursue an HA mission. It will also focus U.S. intentions on specific attainable objectives. As the only world superpower, it is in the interest of the U.S. to maintain diplomatic relevancy by demonstrating leadership and resolve when confronted with a CHE. Using the military sends a very visible message, and when it is committed to action, the world media provide extensive coverage. Forces conducting HA predictably show U.S. compassion and the dedication to assist people in need. For this reason alone, they can be an effective tool to influence world opinion and diplomacy. It is even more effective when using nonlethal forces such as Air Force airlift. Airlift provides assistance by delivering food and supplies without a combative appearance. This is an

acceptable course of action for political leaders, and an appropriate response if the risk to airmen is acceptable.

The pol-mil plan or a similar planning outline always takes place to define how to effectively conduct military operations. The U.S. does not deploy forces without at least a cursory study of the current situation, available resources and their capabilities, and the required tasks to achieve objectives. This planning capability is one of the great aspects of the U.S. military. It allows leadership to develop a clear understanding of the situation and make informed, intelligent decisions. Throughout the process, the goal is to establish an acceptable plan for execution. The planning effort identifies options, and the Air Force is routinely considered for the HA mission when there is a need for action and a risk to forces. The cost of losing American lives in a CHE has, at times, proven to be unacceptable to the politicians. The soldiers killed in Somalia were too high a price to pay for the administration, and the ground forces were withdrawn.

The Air Force is an acceptable resource for politicians when planning estimates indicate the costs of conducting ground HA operations are too high. Air assets mitigate some of these risks simply by their amount of exposure time. This is not to say the Air Force can conduct HA in any environment, and thus, may not always be a politically acceptable response. Operations inside Kosovo, for example, were simply unacceptable for airlift missions despite tremendous pressure to provide aid to IDPs. Phase 1 of the air campaign was to achieve air superiority to allow unrestricted operations. This is always an Air Force task at the beginning of an air campaign, but in Kosovo this condition was never fully realized. Even though the threat from enemy aircraft was effectively eliminated, the mobile surface-to-air radar missiles of Serbia continued to pose a

significant risk to airlift aircraft. Because of this risk, HA operations were limited to the periphery of Kosovo until the war was over. Nevertheless, the airdrop option was evaluated, and had the government accepted the risk, the Air Force would have conducted the mission.

The USAF has lift assets with capabilities not readily available to NGOs or other governments. With those assets it is able to conduct HA missions in extreme circumstances when NGOs are rendered relatively ineffective. Given a hostile environment without a UN peace agreement, the Air Force also provides an option less risky and more politically appealing than committing a large ground force. Based on the FAS test, the Air Force should prepare to conduct the HA mission in future hostile environments and a very important part of this preparation includes developing the necessary doctrine.

Operational doctrine establishes guidelines for acceptable ways to conduct operations. Tactical doctrine provides tactics, techniques, and procedures for approved methods. Most military doctrine is a product of lessons learned to ensure forces operate efficiently and effectively during future operations. The lessons learned from past HA missions are well documented. In addition, both joint and Army doctrine have incorporated these lessons into publications or field manuals. These provide the necessary guidance to identify, train, and equip forces. Unfortunately, Air Force doctrine does not provide adequate operational or tactical doctrine for HA. This lack of doctrine overlooks the Air Force missions of the past decade where HA was conducted in a hostile environment. In every operation, planners were forced to recreate procedures lost over time or reestablish tactical parameters to ensure an acceptable level of risk.

Because HA is classified a noncombat mission, the tactics and procedures to conduct operations are not included in Air Force doctrine. The ability to transport supplies via air to a nonhostile environment does not warrant the need for additional doctrine. The ability to deliver HA in a hostile environment, however, is very different from conventional airlift. A nonpermissive or hostile environment requires tactical operations, to include aircraft equipped with defensive systems and aircrews trained for air and land assault missions. The tactical airlift community is relatively adept at conducting these types of missions to support combat units. However, taking the same risks to support HA efforts has not always proven an acceptable mission for the Air Force. Every HA mission in a hostile environment involving the Air Force required a significant modification in tactics and procedures. Bosnia incorporated the TRIADS method of airdrop and the HDR as a cost effective source of food. Airdrop operations from a high altitude were also incorporated. Four years later in Kosovo, the threat simply did not permit operations to support hundreds of thousands of IDPs. These operations were large Air Force efforts with strategic implications. The necessity to develop ad hoc procedures in response to a future CHE should not be a normal occurrence.

Like Air Force strike missions, HA missions into a hostile environment should be part of a developed air campaign. To ensure the risks are mitigated, airdrop aircraft must be incorporated into an air package with the necessary assets to suppress or counter enemy air and ground threats. If it truly is to become an acceptable Air Force mission, the Air Force must prepare to support it like other air operations. This also includes committing special tactics ground personnel if necessary. In the event large airdrop bundles are used to delivery supplies instead of TRIADS, personnel trained to mark and

secure drop zones will enhance accuracy and safety. This should all be part of operational doctrine to establish a common understanding of capability and enhance planning.

The unique characteristics of a CHE will always require a coordinated planning effort involving representation from the government, military, and humanitarian agencies. Air Force operational doctrine must highlight this process and take an active role to create clarity of purpose. The pol-mil plan provides an excellent tool for this coordinated effort. Air Force planners must understand the process of developing an interagency plan, and how the role of the Air Force fits into the plan. Operational doctrine must include airlift capabilities in unclassified terms to aid planners. This should include an appropriate threat matrix to highlight potentially lethal threats, and, more importantly, a method of risk assessment to highlight vulnerability. This, in conjunction with tactical doctrine, will provide leadership with the necessary information to determine acceptability.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures comprise Air Force tactical doctrine. Each airframe has a specific volume of both classified and unclassified information. These publications are well maintained and provide up-to-date tactical information for combat operations. Specific HA tactics however, are not addressed. Combat tactics are presumed sufficient to use in the event of a humanitarian mission. Although sometimes acceptable, this is usually not the case. Combat tactics for airlift aircraft are designed to insert, resupply, or extract ground troops. More risk is generally accepted and precision is imperative. HA tactical doctrine must include tactics, techniques, and procedures on TRIADS. It should stress threat mitigation over accuracy within acceptable parameters, and stress high altitude, all weather, day and night operations. Ironically, this information

exists in many unit publications but needs to officially be included in Air Force doctrine to facilitate future operations.

The requirements for humanitarian agencies to provide relief to refugees and IDPs continue to strain their capabilities in areas of relative peace. Hostile environments are even more challenging, if not completely prohibitive. The Air Force can provide suitable albeit limited supplies in some CHE. The airlift assets have global capabilities and routinely operate in austere environments. Although the Air Force lacks the expertise to conduct permanent economic reconstruction, it can fill a vital role in a CHE for future operations with a well defined doctrine to assist planners and decision makers in addition to those who execute the HA mission.

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